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PANEL 2: WOMEN, WORK AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
"SHOULDER TO SHOULDER": GENDER AND
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
by
Mary Jane Mossman*
"How just is gender? Why is it that when we turn
to contemporary theories of justice we do not find
illuminating and positive contributions to this ques-
tion? How can theories of justice that are ostensibly
about people in general neglect women, gender, and
all the inequalities between the sexes?"'
These questions reflect both puzzlement and frustration about
the ways in which intellectual inquiries about justice, and access
to justice, are constructed. They represent challenges to our con-
ceptualizing about justice and to the research methodology we use
in our scholarly work. They demand that we take into account
inequality on the basis of sex, both in theory and in practice, and
use it to inform our debates about both the meaning of justice
and our relative access to it. And these questions also require us
to recognize the impact of power (and of powerlessness) on theories
of justice and of the constraints thereby imposed on our differing
conceptions about the issues of access to justice.
This paper is a reflection about these questions and the nature
of the relationship between gender and access to justice. At the
outset, I approached my task for this Symposium as a scholarly
exercise focusing on the questions posed by the Symposium or-
ganizers under the title "Women, Work and Access to Justice".
In doing so, two insistent questions emerged, both of which reflect
on our roles and responsibilities as access to justice scholars. One
was a question about the specific focus of this topic on women,
a focus absent from the titles for other panels. Such a focus might
mean that women were to be the focus of one panel and that men
would be the focus of all others. Alternatively, women and men
might have been intended to be included in the discussion in all
the panels, with a special focus in the panel on "Women, Work
and Access to Justice" on issues relating to women. Although the
Symposium organizers asserted from the beginning their intent that
all panels focus on women and men, this aspiration was not always
* Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University and Professor of Law,
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accomplished in practice, in my view. More significantly, the male
norm implicit in the standpoint of some papers may have actually
obscured the problems of access to justice for women. Thus, while
the Symposium organizers conscientiously intended to make gender
relevant, their expectations were not always fulfilled satisfactorily.
Such a conclusion inevitably raises difficult issues for those involved
in a woman-specific panel: problems about scholarship as well as
of collegiality.
Second, in the course of my work on this paper, I became involved
in a specific dispute about access to legal aid services for battered
women in Ontario, a dispute which necessarily enlivened my ideas
about gender and access to justice and the issues of substance and
process involved. In this context, I became aware of the gendered
ways in which access to justice scholars have traditionally con-
structed the issues, as well as the failure of such scholars to recognize
the ways in which their gender neutrality has contributed to a formal
equality approach and the denial of substantive access to justice
for women. In reflecting on these issues, moreover, I have begun
to respond to the need to ask questions about the process of social
and legal change - and about the responsibility of scholars for
such change - to make justice accessible to women.
This paper is, therefore, an exploration of these themes, including
the need to reconceptualize justice from a gender perspective; to
re-think the appropriate methodologies for defining access to justice
for women and men; and the roles and responsibilities of access
to justice scholars in the context of the gendered justice debate.
Reconceptualizing Women, Work and Access to Justice:
The starting point for my analysis was the series of five questions
posed by the Symposium organizers,2 all broadly related to issues
of access to justice in the context of women and work. All five
questions focused on women in the paid labour force, and all were
framed in gender-neutral language.3 The underlying assumption of
2 The program outline indicated that the panel on "Women, Work and Access
to Justice" would
"... focus on the issues of justice related to women and work, specifically
with regard to the following:
a) access to education in the professions and trades;
b) access to training programs and retraining programs;
c) the recruitment and promotion of women within workplaces;
d) adaptation of the workplace to accommodate needs of childbearing and
childrearing; and
e) the impact of working women on the private, public and corporate
sectors."
As will be evident from this paper, the original focus of the panel evolved
to include broader concerns about women and access to justice.
3 Note, however, that the language of gender neutrality about "childbearing
and childrearing" assumes that such needs are ones which require accom-
modation, reflecting the existence of a norm which is male persons who
do not have such needs.
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the questions was the inequality of women in the paid labour force
and the need for reforms to provide women with those employment
opportunities which are now available to men. Although the implicit
objective of such reforms is justice for women as workers, such
a construction of the issues also reflects the traditional formal
equality paradigm - how women can acquire what men already
have just because they are men.4
Encouraged by the Symposium organizers to re-think these issues,
however, my analysis first led me to define the issues about women
and work in a different way. Instead of constructing the issues in
terms of permitting women to participate in paid work as men
do, we might instead re-examine our fundamental assumptions about
the separation of work and family life, and thereby recognize the
needs of both women and men for some balancing of their
responsibilities at home and in the workplace.5 In this context, the
issue is one about the ways in which gender affects our access
to justice both as workers in the paid labour force and in our family
life; it requires us to seek beyond the male equality paradigm and
fundamentally define the relation between justice and gender.6
Refocusing these questions in the panel about "Women, Work
and Access to Justice" also helped me to express my concerns about
the impact (or not) of gender in the other panels at the Symposium.
How is such an arrangement usually understood, both by those
of us who participate in the woman-specific panel and by those
involved in others? Is there general agreement, for example, that
gender is a factor, a variable, a matter to be taken into account
in all these panel discussions about access to justice? More theo-
retically, should we assume that men and women are similarly
situated in relation to access to justice, and that all panels are (or
should be) implicitly concerned with persons of both genders? Thus,
should we assume that women are easily "added on" once we have
4 "Why should you have to be the same as a man to get what a man
gets simply because he is one? Why does maleness provide an original
entitlement, not questioned on the basis of its gender, so that it is women
- women who want to make a case of unequal treatment in a world
men have made in their image . . . - who have to show in effect that
they are men in every relevant respect, unfortunately mistaken for women
on the basis of an accident of birth?"
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1987), 37.
5 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Exploring a Research Agenda of the Femini-
zation of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change" (1989),
14 Law and Soc. Inquiry 289.
6 An interesting effort to examine gender in the justice system is Frances
Heidensohn, "Models of Justice: Portia or Persephone? Some Thoughts on
Equality, Fairness and Gender in the Field of Criminal Justice" (1986), 14
Int. J. of Soc. of Law 287, 289:
"Are we then justified in saying that there is a particularly female or
feminist concept ofjustice which the criminal justice system of patriarchal
society violates? If this is so, what would be special and distinctive about
feminist justice: a just treatment of women?"
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identified the pressing problems of men and access to justice? Or,
instead, must we recognize our own gendered experiences of reality
in constructing issues of access to justice from the beginning?7
These questions are not merely academic, although they are
profoundly significant to the integrity of our scholarship. It has
been suggested, for example, that men's and women's experiences
may contribute to significantly different conceptions of what is the
"problem":
Making women's real life experiences visible and understood as they
relate to the law means, for example, informing the profession about
the actual rates of sexual and domestic assault against women and
the fear of this pervasive violence with which women live every
day. A University of Kentucky law professor begins the rape section
of her criminal law course by asking each male student to tell the
class what he does on a daily basis to protect himself from sexual
assault. The response is a puzzled silence. Then she asks the female
students, each of whom has something to say: "I don't go to a certain
mall because its parking lot is badly lit"; "Before I get into my
car I look to see if anyone is in the back seat"; "I don't come to
campus at times when there won't be many people around"; "I sleep
with my windows locked no matter what the weather." The first
time this professor tried this teaching technique, one woman said,
"I don't worry about anything any more - I carry a loaded gun,"
and opened her handbag to take out a pistol.8
Just as these experiences about safety were gendered, so it may
be significant for our conceptualizing about access to justice to
take gender into account.9 What difference does it make for defining
7 Another way of focusing on this issue is to question why no men were asked
to be commentators on the panel on "Women, Work and Access to Justice";
is this therefore just a "women's issue", or is it an issue about gender and
access to justice? In this context, it is also interesting to try to assess the
extent to which the decade of volumes of the Windsor Yearbook of Access
to Justice has adequately reflected issues of gender and justice. Such an
assessment is difficult to accomplish with certainty, in part (it is suggested)
because the issue of gendered justice is so frequently obscured by an
assumption that men and women are fungible as persons in the justice system.
Both in the Yearbook and in the Symposium, there is a need to focus explicitly
on whether defined issues affect both men and women, and if so, whether
there are differences in the impact of access policies which are due to gender.
8 Lynn Hecht Schafran, "Lawyers' Lives, Clients' Lives: Can Women Liberate
the Profession?" (1989), 34 Villanova LR 1105. See also Hecht Schafran,
"Gender Bias in the Courts: Time is Not the Cure" (1989), 22 Creighton
LR 413; and Hecht Schafran, "Women in the Courts Today: How Much
Has Changed" (1988), 6 Law and Inequality 27.
9 See, for example, Judith Olans Brown, Wendy E. Parmet, and Phyllis Tropper
Baumann, "The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in Constitutional
Dissonance" (1987), 36 Buffalo LR 573; Colleen Sheppard, "Equality,
Ideology and Oppression: Women and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1986), 10 DaL LJ. 195; and Elizabeth Sheehy, "Canadian Judges
and the Law of Rape: Should the Charter Insulate Bias?" (1989), 21 Ottawa
LR 151.
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the problem, for example, if we begin the analysis with a hypothetical
tenant if the tenant is a welfare mother in public housing rather
than a male student in an urban apartment building?10 What
difference does it make to our conceptualizing of the problems
of civil litigation if we start by imagining a mother seeking custody
of her children rather than a male consumer suing a merchant?,"
What differences are there in the substantive and procedural
arrangements for the battered wife seeking a restraining order 12
by contrast with a man suing for injuries at work? Whose problems,
moreover, are most frequently addressed by our conceptions of
access to justice and the law reform studies and proposals we discuss?
And if legal changes occur more slowly in areas of law reform
which more often affect women, how should we take this foot-
dragging into account in thinking about the differential impact of
gender on access to justice?
10 The problem of providing legal services to women who are poor and often
in receipt of social assistance has been addressed frequently. For example,
see Laurie Woods, "The Challenge Facing Legal Services in the 80's" (1982),
16 Clearinghouse Rev. 26; Diana Pearce, "Welfare is Not For Women: Toward
a Model of Advocacy to Meet the Needs of Women in Poverty" (1985),
19 Clearinghouse Rev. 412; Elizabeth Holtzman, "Women and the Law"
(1986) 31 Villanova LR 1429; Mary O'Donoghue, "Access to Family Law
for Ethnic Women:Some Policy Initiatives" (Unpublished: 1988); and Na-
tional Council of Welfare, Women and Poverty Revisited (1990).
11 See "Developments in Women and Family Law: 1981" (1982), 15 Clear-
inghouse Rev. 748; Laurie Woods, "Challenges Facing Legal Services in
the 1990's: Perspectives of Women and Family Law Advocates" (1988),
22 Clearinghouse Rev. 457; Carol Smart, "The Legal and Moral Ordering
of Child Custody" (Unpublished: 1990); Susan Boyd, "Child Custody and
Working Mothers" in Sheilah Martin and Kathleen Mahoney, eds., Equality
and Judicial Neutrality (1987); and Elizabeth Pickett, "Women, Law and
Family Mediation: A Feminist View of Formal and Informal Justice in Family
Law" (LL.M. Thesis, OHLS: 1989).
12 See Linda MacLeod, Battered But Not Beaten... Preventing Wife Battering
in Canada (Can. Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1987); N. Zoe
Hilton, "One in Ten: The Struggle and Disempowerment of the Battered
Women's Movement" (1989), 7 Canm J. of Family Law 313; Mary-Lou Fassel,
"Wife Assault and the Criminal Justice System: Can Women Find Fairness
in a System Built for Men?" (1990), 8 Vis a Vis #1, 1; Donna Denham,
"Wife Assault and the Criminal Justice System: The Search for Better Ways
to Stop the Violence" (1990), 8 Visa Vis #2, 1; Community Legal Education
Ontario, Assaulted Women's Advocates'Manual (1988); Donald Dutton, "The
Criminal Justice System Response to Wife Assault" (Min. of Solicitor-
General: 1984); Note, "The Battered Woman: When a Woman's 'Place'
is in the Courts" (1988), 10 Crim. Justice J. 273; Naomi Archer, "Battered
Women and the Legal System: Past, Present and Future" (1989), 13 Law
and Psych. R 145; Peter Neidig, "Women's Shelters, Men's Collectives and
Other Issues in the Field of Spouse Abuse" (1984), 9 Victimology 464; and
Jeffrey L. Edleson, "Violence is the Issue: A Critique of Neidig's Assumptions"
(1984), 9 Victimology 483.
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Gendered Justice and Research Methodology:
In exploring the relation between gender and justice, the choice
of research methodology is critical. Because gender is constructed
within a social context, it is necessary to document the extent of
women's inequality of status in economic and political terms, as
well as their double responsibilities in the paid labour force and
at home.13 It is also necessary to take account of the impact of
race and class on women's experiences of inequality:14 what kinds
of barriers are experienced by women in different contexts and
how do these different experiences shape our fundamental assump-
tions about gender and justice?
Litigation in recent years, particularly in the context of Charter
claims, has significantly challenged the ways in which such questions
of justice and gender are posed. The recognition on the part of
the Supreme Court of Canada of the pervasiveness of sexual
harassment (Janzen)15, the existence of the battered wife's syndrome
(Lavallee)16, the appropriateness of a definition of inequality based
on disadvantage and powerlessness (Mark Andrews)1" and of em-
ployment rights in the context of pregnancy (Brooks)18 all attest
to the impact of questioning underlying assumptions about the nature
of gender and justice.19 At the same time, however, different kinds
of research questions must be posed to assess the impact of these
pronouncements on women in Canadian society, and particularly
on those who are most disadvantaged. Women receiving welfare
benefits, for example, cannot benefit from pregnancy rights for
employed workers; and there is little evidence that the concept of
disadvantage and powerlessness will be extended to include issues
of economic security (rather than political rights).2 0 Moreover, while
women receiving welfare benefits may experience sexual harassment
or battering in their homes, nothing in the Supreme Court's decisions
has concretely enhanced the resources of human rights commissions
across Canada to ensure access to remedies for sexual harassment
13 For an overview, see Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender
of Law (1990).
14 See, for example, Sue Ellen M. Charlton, Jana Everett, Kathleen Staudt,
eds., Women, the State and Development (1989); and Marlee Kline, "Race,
Racism and Feminist Legal Theory" (1989), 12 Harv. Women's LJ. 115.
15 Janzen and Govereau v. Pharos Restaurant and Grammas (1989), 95 N.R.
81.
16 R v. Lavallee (1990), 108 N.R. 321.
17 Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989), 91 N.R. 255.
18 Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd. (1989), 94 N.R. 373.
19 See Susan Moller Oken, Justice, Gender and the Family, supra note 1.
20 See Erika Abner, "The Merits of the Use of Constitutional Litigation to
Unravel the Fabric of the Feminization of Poverty in Canada" (LL.M. Thesis,
OHLS: 1989); and E. Abner, M.J. Mossman and E. Pickett, "'No More
Than Simple Justice': Assessing the Royal Commission Report on Women,
Poverty and the Family" (1991), 23 Ottawa LR (forthcoming).
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or prevented the cutback in funding for battered women's shelters.21
A research methodology which begins with an analysis of gendered
justice must take account of the gap between changes in the law's
discourse and changes in women's lives. 22
A more critical research methodology is also needed to explore
issues of gender and justice in the resources of the legal system
as a whole. To what extent are women represented among the
clients of large law firms in Canada, either as individuals or as
corporate clients? What percentage of litigants before courts and
tribunals are women? Are there significant differences in the extent
to which women have access to tribunals by contrast with courts?
And are women more likely to make use of some tribunals rather
than others? Has the percentage of women using the legal system
increased as the percentage of women lawyers and judges has
increased over the past two decades? If not, does this mean that
justice can be gendered even when our legal system is peopled
by women as well as men?23
In significant ways, such questions are difficult to answer. A study
published a number of years ago24 concluded that women did not
use the courts as frequently as men, although the difference was
smaller for women plaintiffs than for women defendants. The study
assessed a number of possible explanations for the "underrepres-
entation" of women in the courts and concluded that:
the frequency with which women are found in civil or criminal cases
across the nation is possibly an indicator of their less than full
participation, as a class of persons in mainstream activities in this
society. This underparticipation in social affairs is a product of culture
(the accretion of habits, ways of doing things, socialization, and
notions of what behaviour is appropriate for men and women, etc.)
21 For an imaginative legal response to the funding problem, see Michael Terry,
Nina Balsam and Ruth Przybeck, "Litigation of the Necessaries Doctrine:
Funding for Battered Women's Shelters" (1984), 17 Clearinghouse Rev. 1192.
22 The "gap theory" has been addressed frequently from a theoretical pers-
pective - although it has a particular resonance for women and the justice
system. More generally (and without reference to gender issues), see David
Nelken, "The 'Gap Problem' in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review"
(1981), 1 Windsor Yearb. Access Justice 35. See also Donald Black, So-
ciological Justice (1989) and Susan E. Laurence, The Poor in Court (1990).
23 See, for example, Lorraine Weinrib, "Women in the Legal Profession: Old
Issues, Current Problems" (1990), 24 Law Soc. Gazette 71; Nina Burleigh,
"Black Women Lawyers", [1988] ABA Journal 64; David W. Allen and
Diane E. Wall, "The Behaviour of Women State Supreme Court Justices:
Are They Tokens or Outsiders?" (1987), 12 Justice System J. 232; Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, "Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law" (1987), 42 U, of Miami LR 29; Note:
"The First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on
Women in the Courts - 1984" (1986), 9 Women's Rights LR 129; and
Note: "Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts"
(1986-87), 15 Fordham Urban LJ. 1.
24 C. McKie and P. Reed, Women in the Civil Courts (Statistics Canada, 1979).
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and of law (the inbuilt bias in favour of men being major property
holders and manipulators).2 5
Information about the participation rates for women and men before
tribunals and in access to legal aid certificates is even more uncertain
or not available; and for many tribunals26, access rates are not
collected or published by sex of litigants. Similarly, while legal aid
statistics about the numbers of criminal and civil certificates suggest
a disproportionately high rate of access for men, a more compre-
hensive methodology is needed to assess accurately the impact of
gender on access to justice in the legal system.27
Yet, the available research does suggest some difference in the
status of women in society, a status which is reflected in the inequality
of access and participation within the legal system. Such a conclusion
may offer comfort to those whose objective is to ensure that the
legal system merely responds to societal expectations, but it is cold
comfort to those who expect justice ungendered.28 It is as if these
differing perspectives envisage the image of justice in two different
ways: for some, the image of justice as a woman with the scales
in her hand and her eyes blindfolded means that the law's role
in society is neutral, reflecting rather than creating societal change;
while for others, the image of justice as a woman is ironic, with
her decidedly uneven (in terms of power and resources?) scales
and her blindfolded eyes which cannot bear to see the gender bias
of the justice system. In terms of research methodology, it matters
a lot whether we begin with one or other of these images of justice.
As scholars, moreover, we must confront these differences in our
images of justice, in our research methods, and in our conceptions
of the issues of access to justice: is gender-neutral justice possible
in a gendered society?29
25 Id., 20.
26 The 1988-89 Annual Report of the Social Assistance Review Board indicated
that 42.8% of its hearings involved women appellants, while 57.2% involved
men (see Annual Report, Table 15, 43); while the 1988-89 Annual Report
of the Ontario Human Rights Commission reported that there were 565
complaints (settled, dismissed and withdrawn) by males, by comparison with
755 by females (of which 152 concerned sex and pregnancy and 98 concerned
sexual harassment - 32 male complaints concerned sex and pregnancy
and 2 concerned sexual harassment).
27 See Mossman, "Civil Legal Aid Services in Canada: Policy Options" (Dept.
of Justice, 1990), especially, 67 and 101.
28 See Martha Minow, "Foreword: Justice Engendered" (1987), 101 Harv. LR
10.
29 See Isabel Marcus, "Reflections on the Significance of the Sex-Gender System:
Divorce Law Reform in New York" (1987), 42 U. of Miami LR 55. This
issue has been addressed most recently in the context of alternative methods
for dispute resolution. For examples, see James Richardson, "Divorce and
Family Mediation Research Study in Three Canadian Cities" (Dept. of Justice:
1988); Jane Mugford, ed., "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (Australian Inst.
of Criminology, 1986); Thomas Christian, "Community Dispute Resolution:
First-Class Process or Second-Class Justice?" (1986), 14 Rev. of Law &
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Issues of Power and Change: Who Cares? Whose Responsibility?
These issues about the ways in which we conceptualize the
problem of access to justice and the research methodology we adopt
in our scholarship were enlivened for me by a recent and real-
life issue of women's access to justice. In thinking about the real-
life problem, it was necessary to confront the issues of scholarship
in terms of the practice of access to justice, and to ask searching
questions about power and powerlessness in the quest for justice,
about the nature of societal and legal change, and about the impact
of gender on the ways in which we assume, or do not assume,
responsibility for women's access to justice.
The specific problem concerned a decision on the part of the
Students' Legal Aid Society (SLAS) at the University of Ottawa
Law School to provide legal services to battered women.30 In
adopting the policy, the students accepted the view that the existence
Soc. Change 771; Craig A. McEwan, "Differing Visions of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Formal Law" (1987), 12 Justice System J. 247; Linda
Hay, Carol Carnevale and Anthony Sinicropi, "Professionalization: Selected
Ethical Issues in Dispute Resolution" (1984), 9 Justice System J. 228; Lisa
G. Lerman, "Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal
Dispute Resolution on Women" (1984), 7 Harv. Women's -J 57; Martha
Bailey, "Unpacking the 'Rational Alternative': A Critical Review of Family
Mediation Movement Claims" (1989), 8 Can. J. Family Law 61; Christine
B. Harrington, Shadow Justice (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "The Trans-
formation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does and
Does Not Tell Us", [ 1985] J. Dispute Resolution 25; Janet Rifkin, "Mediation
From a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems" (1984), 2 Law and
Inequality 21; Helen R. Weingarten and Elizabeth Douvan, "Male and Female
Visions of Mediation" (1985), Negotiation J. 349; and Ross Cranston, "Courts,
Tribunals and Alternative Institutions (1986), 11 Legal Service Bulletin 21.
30 The students' proposal was initially communicated in July 1990 in the context
of the creation of a Women's Division within the University of Ottawa
SLAS. Among other goals, the Women's Division was intended to provide
victim accompaniment services, that is:
acting as agents for women who are survivors of assault and who are
in need of support in dealing with the legal aspects of a prosecution.
Our members would act on behalf of the client in contact with the police
and the Crown's office. As well, they would inform the client of all
available options so that she can make her own decisions. Our involvement
would extend to matters such as peace bonds, restraining orders and
related legal remedies.
See Proposal for the Creation of a Women's Division of the U. of 0. Student
Legal Aid Society, July 1990, 1. A similar policy was adopted at Parkdale
Community Legal Services in Toronto in 1982, and at a number of other
legal clinics funded by the Ontario Legal Aid Plan. The Parkdale policy
was defined as follows:
That this clinic recognizes wife assault as a serious issue and wishes
to pursue a program of community education and law reform on this
matter and that to facilitate this program the clinic will not represent
male clients in cases where spousal assault (spouse to be widely defined)
is an issue, unless we are unable to find other representation for the
client.
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of violence against women in our society is a matter which should
be addressed through the provision of timely legal advice and
assistance on a broad range of legal matters which confront women
subjected to spousal assault (including options about laying criminal
charges, but also information about housing, employment, childcare,
welfare, and civil actions for assault).3' Moreover, in adopting the
policy, the students accepted the idea that women seeking legal
advice in these circumstances would need to feel physically secure
in the legal clinic setting. They therefore decided not to act for
men charged with assault in any of these cases, thereby confirming
and providing notice of their role as advocates for women subjected
to violence.32
The choices made by the students were not reached without
consideration, and their policy was consistent with both the literature
on the issue of wife assault 33 as well as with the practices of a
number of other legal aid clinics in Ontario. 34 In this respect, their
policy was arguably supportable in theory and in practice. Non-
etheless, the policy was subjected to very serious attack on the
part of members of the criminal defence bar in Ottawa,35 inves-
tigated by a special committee of the Law Society of Upper
31 See Deborah Sinclair, Understanding Wife Assault (1985); and Laura Crites,
"A Judicial Guide to Understanding Wife Abuse" (1985), 24"Judges J. 5.
32 See Education Wife Assault, Factsheet" Wife Assault in Canada (1988); and
"Violence in Canadian Society" in (1987), 7 Juristat #2, 13.
33 See Linda MacLeod, supra note 12; and other articles cited there. See also
R. v. Lavalee, supra note 16.
14 Supra note 30.
35 Two complaints were filed, one to the Chair of the Law Society's Legal
Aid Committee and another to the Chair of its Professional Conduct
Committee. The complaints alleged that the students' policy violated "the
most sacred principles on which our justice system is based" and constituted
discrimination on the basis of sex. It was suggested also that the students
were duplicating services available through the Victim Witness Assistance
Program, and that' the students' policy would "quite conceivably hamper
their employability" as articling students, particularly if the students ap-
proached a criminal law firm for employment. As the complainant suggested,
in support of this latter allegation:
It would obviously be of concern to a potential employer that such
a student had spent one or two years in the Student Legal Aid Program
operating under a policy that discriminated on the basis of sex. Most
criminal law firms, as you can imagine, are regularly retained by male
accused charged with assault on a partner. If a student has a bias against
such matters, the student is of no assistance to his employer. I wish
to state, however, that this latter proposition is not as important as
the fundamental position that this policy violates the most sacred
principles on which our justice system is based. (Emphasis added).
See letter from Michael J. Neville to Marc J. Somerville, Chairman (sic)
of the LSUC Professional Conduct Committee dated October 3, 1990. See
also a similar letter from Michael J. Neville to Thomas G. Bastedo, Chairman
(sic) of the LSUC Legal Aid Committee.
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Canada,36 and became the focus of adverse media attention for
several months.37 During this period, many women lawyers and
several women's organizations overtly offered support for the policy
adopted by the SLAS38; by contrast, few male lawyers or scholars
regarded the matter with concern and fewer still became involved
in the dispute as one primarily concerned with access to justice
for women. Indeed, at the point where scholarship met praxis in
this context, the issue of access to justice for women who were
36 A special committee was established by Convocation of the LSUC on October
12, 1990. The committee included the Chair of Professional Conduct (Marc
Somerville), Legal Aid (Thomas Bastedo) and Women in the Legal Profession
(Fran Kiteley). The committee conducted an investigation and a full-day
meeting with interested parties in October/November 1990. For a full
chronology and list of documents, see Law Society materials prepared as
background for the meeting with interested parties on November 24, 1990.
17 See, for example, "Truce Called in Ottawa Legal Aid Dispute", Law Times
Oct. 29 - Nov. 4, 1990; "Depriving Accused of Rights Wrong Way to
Stem Violence Against Women", Ottawa Citizen.
38 The National Association of Women and the Law attended the LSUC meeting
and made submissions. There was also a letter of support filed by the Women's
Legal Education and Action Fund. The letter submitted by LEAF stated
in part:
Legal aid has been an important development in improving access to
justice for all low-income Canadians. An important development in legal
aid, particularly in Ontario, has been the availability of legal aid
certificates for low-income individuals accused of crimes. The criminal
legal aid system in Ontario is relatively generous and accused, including
those in the Ottawa area, do not as a rule have difficulty obtaining counsel.
By contrast, the legal aid system has not been successful in responding
to the justice needs of women who are victims of violence, whether
by their spouses, an acquaintance or a stranger. Where violence occurs
raising family law issues, the reality is that women have a great deal
of difficulty finding counsel to represent them. Many lawyers find that
the legal aid system does not adequately compensate them for the
necessary time to represent their clients properly in accordance with
the rules set by the Law Society. The legal aid system is even less
responsive to the legal needs in the criminal justice system of women
as victims of violence.
In this light, the policy of the Ottawa clinic may be seen as promoting
the equality of women, by promoting equal access to justice for women
to address the violence that women specifically experience. It provides
a service that is not otherwise available to a disadvantaged group without
in any way jeopardizing the relatively significant societal resources
already currently available to those accused of such violence. The clinic
would be limited in its ability to accomplish its equality-promoting
objectives if it did represent such male accuseds. It would be forced
to reject particular women as clients because of individual cases of conflict
of interest. It would not be able to dedicate its resources to developing
a more comprehensive consistent service to a disadvantaged group. It
would risk undermining that service by the temptation to put forward
the type of defence to charges that feeds into myths about violence,
frequently made part of a "complete" defence.
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subjected to violence seemed to be essentially a "women's issue",
and not an issue of access to justice.
The issues in such a dispute are complex, and require an analysis
of a number of issues: the role of Student Legal Aid Societies within
the overall context of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan, the relationship
between students and members of the practising bar in the provision
of duty counsel services, the extent of accountability for decisions
about case priorities on the part of a SLAS, and the meaning of
the Rules of Professional Conduct in relation to a decision not
to act for a client, especially in the context of a legal aid system
which is not comprehensive. All of these issues are important and
need to be addressed.
Yet, what is fundamental to our conceptualizing about the issue
of access to justice for women who are subjected to violence, and
what is fundamental to assessing an appropriate research metho-
dology here, are the ways in which the legal system has system-
atically organized access to legal aid so that men charged with
violence are entitled to legal advice and assistance, while women
who are their victims are not. Moreover, because the Ottawa SLAS
embarked on a policy which was designed to change the status
quo in terms of access to justice, the students' decision was subjected
to a sustained attack by criminal defence lawyers who characterized
the problem in terms of access to legal representation on the part
of accused persons who face the resources of the state ranged against
them in a criminal matter. In spite of this traditional characterization
of what was at issue, it is undeniable that the dispute also occurred
in the context of a question of gender and access to justice.
Because it is overwhelmingly men as a group who commit violent
actions against their partners, making violence against women a
systemic problem for our society, the gendered nature of access
to legal aid services has to be taken into account in assessing women's
access to justice. Moreover, the resistance to the provision of student
In recent jurisprudence the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized
the importance of promoting the equality of disadvantaged groups, and
that a distinction per se does not amount to inequality. (Andrews v. Law
Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143). True equality will
require that government and others respond to the needs of disadvantaged
groups; in other words, equality often mandates a positive action, rather
than an inaction which reinforces inequality. The importance of ame-
liorating group disadvantage is recognized in sections 13 and 17 of the
Ontario Human Rights Code and section 15(2) of the Charter. Further,
recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence has recognized sexual
harassment, often including sexual and other assault, as a practice of
sex discrimination to which our legal system must be responsive. (Janzen
v. Platy Enterprises Ltd, [19891 1 S.C.R. 1253.) Viewed in this light,
the policy of the Ottawa clinic, reflecting a commitment to addressing
sex inequality, is one that ought to be supported and encouraged as
consistent with and furthering legislative and constitutional equality
standards.
See letter from Helena Orton to LSUC, dated Nov.22, 1990, 2.
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legal aid services to such women, in the context of legal aid services
for accused persons (provided by lawyers) which disproportionately
benefit men, suggests that the issue is also one of gendered access
to power and gendered resistance to change. In such a context,
it is appropriate for scholars to ask whether the responsibility for
ensuring access to justice for women is similarly a gendered
responsibility, a matter which belongs to women alone?
In the final analysis, who cares whether women and men have
equal access to justice? Moreover, in the context of a Symposium
celebrating ten years of access to justice scholarship, is it not time
to ask scholars of both genders to accept responsibility for re-
thinking the issues of gender and access to justice? As a colleague
explained (in a slightly different context):
The question is not, as one commentator put it, who will speak
to women's fundamental rights to pursue their interests with dignity
and without harassment. Women are doing that .... The real question
is who will stand shoulder to shoulder with them. (Emphasis added)3 9
39 Crystal Buchan, "Dancing in the Minefields?" (1990), 11 Jurisfemme #1,
24, referring to J. Kierans, "Where Were the Guardians?", Globe and Mail
May 1990, 4. This quotation referred more specifically, of course, to the
issue of sex discrimination in universities. Significantly, the issue of violence
against women is one which is shared by women who are lawyers, law
professors and law students. For legal scholars who are also law teachers
and university administrators, therefore, the issue of "standing shoulder to
shoulder" with women seeking equality and access to justice is an issue
of both scholarship and praxis.
VOL 10
